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Abstract (269 words) 17 
Corruption is one of the most serious obstacles for ecosystem management and biodiversity 18 
conservation. In particular, more than half of the loss of forested area in many tropical 19 
countries is due to illegal logging, with corruption implicated in a lack of enforcement. Here 20 
we study an evolutionary game model to analyze the illegal harvesting of forest trees, coupled 21 
with the corruption of rule enforcers. We consider several types of harvesters, who may or 22 
may not be committed towards supporting an enforcer service, and who may cooperate (log 23 
legally) or defect (log illegally). We also consider two types of rule enforcers, honest and 24 
corrupt: while honest enforcers fulfill their function, corrupt enforcers accept bribes from 25 
defecting harvesters and refrain from fining them. We report three key findings. First, in the 26 
absence of strategy exploration, the harvester-enforcer dynamics are bistable: one continuum 27 
of equilibria consists of defecting harvesters and a low fraction of honest enforcers, while 28 
another consists of cooperating harvesters and a high fraction of honest enforcers. Both 29 
continua attract nearby strategy mixtures. Second, even a small rate of strategy exploration 30 
removes this bistability, rendering one of the outcomes globally stable. It is the relative rate of 31 
exploration among enforcers that then determines whether most harvesters cooperate or defect 32 
and most enforcers are honest or corrupt, respectively. This suggests that the education of 33 
enforcers, causing their more frequent trialing of honest conduct, can be a potent means of 34 
curbing corruption. Third, if information on corrupt enforcers is available, and players react 35 
opportunistically to it, the domain of attraction of cooperative outcomes widens considerably. 36 
We conclude by discussing policy implications of our results. 37 
Keywords: line segments of equilibria, bistability, exploration-induced-equilibrium, 38 
information 39 
40 
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1. Introduction 41 
Although the “tragedy of the commons” is ubiquitous (Hardin, 1968), field research on 42 
governing the commons, as well as laboratory experiments on public good games, show that, 43 
sometimes, cooperation can be maintained and the tragedy avoided (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; 44 
Henrich, 2006; Henrich et al., 2006; Rutagi et al., 2010). In particular, research by Elinor 45 
Ostrom and colleagues has shown that people are frequently able to discuss, establish, and 46 
enforce rules defining a system of punishment for rule breakers (Ostrom, 2000). In her view, 47 
institutions are tools for providing incentives to promote cooperation (Ostrom and Walker, 48 
1997; Ostrom et al., 2004). Ostrom’s basic design principles for social settings that allow 49 
long-lasting resource use include the successful establishment of a monitoring and 50 
sanctioning system (Ostrom, 1990). Such systems provide examples of mechanisms that 51 
enforce cooperation by punishing defectors. 52 
 The general theory of sanctioning mechanisms has been studied extensively (e.g., 53 
Tyler and Degoey, 1995; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; 54 
Dreber et al., 2008; Egas et al., 2008; Sigmund, 2008; Casari and Luini, 2009; Nakamaru and 55 
Dieckmann, 2009; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2010; Baldassari and Grossman, 2011; 56 
Chauduri, 2011; Iwasa and Lee, 2013; Shimano and Nakamaru, 2013). In some situations, 57 
individual players directly punish defectors (peer punishment; Fowler, 2005; Bochet et al., 58 
2006; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Gürerk et al., 2006; Gächter at al., 2008; Ertan et al., 2009). 59 
Alternatively, players may establish a costly police-like system for punishing defectors, which 60 
is specialized on spotting and fining defectors (pool punishment; Yamagishi, 1984; VanVugt 61 
et al., 2009; Kamei et al., 2011; Sigmund et al., 2011; Andreoni and Gee, 2012; Traulsen et 62 
al., 2012). For such a system to function effectively, the hired rule enforcers (or inspectors, 63 
officers, janitors, sheriffs) have to work properly. In some situations, however, the rule 64 
enforcers can be corrupt, accepting bribes from defectors and then refrain from fining them. 65 
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 Illegal logging is a typical example of how the tragedy of the commons may 66 
jeopardize a common good. Since each individual harvester can gain from logging more trees 67 
than other harvesters, preventing unsustainable overharvesting requires establishing standards 68 
for legal logging. And when the tasks of monitoring and sanctioning harvesters according to 69 
those standards are delegated to third parties, corruption may arise. Corruption is known to be 70 
positively correlated with illegal logging in many places around the world, including 71 
Indonesia, China, Southern Asia, and West and Central Africa (Seneca Creek Associates, 72 
2004). For some countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and Bolivia, indicative estimates of 73 
illegal logging even exceed 80% (FAO, 2005; European Forest Institute, 2005). Illegal 74 
logging occurs widely and persistently, at both state and community levels (Corbridge and 75 
Kumar, 2002; Véron et al., 2006; World Bank, 2006). A statistical analysis of forest 76 
management showed that efficient judicial systems deter rule breaking, increase the 77 
compliance of harvesting firms, and reduce corruption (Diarra and Marchand, 2011). At the 78 
theoretical end, Mishra (2006) discussed a game model in which a public official may siphon 79 
off public goods – an unlawful action that is supposed to be stopped by a politician, but may 80 
continue if the public official bribes the politician, as well as a major fraction of citizens. 81 
These studies underscore the general understanding that corruption tends to ruin joint efforts, 82 
leading to resource depletion and distorted distribution.  83 
 In this paper, we study conditions and mechanisms for curbing corruption, using very 84 
simplified models, rather than realistic models incorporating the many details that may affect 85 
corruption in particular situations. We deliberately focus on the simplest possible situations in 86 
order to identify the key elements for controlling the corruption of rule enforcers. We thus 87 
hope to derive general insights and conclusions that may be applicable to a broad range of 88 
other social dilemmas. 89 
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 Specifically, we consider a situation in which a group of harvesters establish a rule to 90 
restrain logging. Hired enforcers monitor the harvesters who commit to the rule and fine 91 
defectors who harvest the common forest excessively. We assume that rule enforcers are paid 92 
by the harvesters, rather than being funded through an external source or organization: this 93 
corresponds to the ‘grass roots’ institutions studied by Ostrom (e.g., Ostrom and Walker, 94 
1997; Ostrom, 2000). To investigate whether this rule enforcement system can emerge as a 95 
social institution in the modeled community, we use replicator dynamics describing social 96 
learning occurring through the imitation of successful role models (e.g., Sigmund, 2010). On 97 
this basis, we investigate conditions favoring cooperative harvesters and honest enforcers, 98 
respectively. 99 
 After establishing results for this simple model as a baseline, we extend our analyses 100 
in two directions. First, we study a series of models differing in exploration rates among 101 
strategies, and second, we investigate the effects arising from the availability of information 102 
on corrupt enforcers. The resulting dynamical systems show typical nonlinear behavior, such 103 
as a strong dependence on initial conditions, heteroclinic cycles, and stable long-term 104 
oscillations. Based on our findings, we conclude that the education of enforcers, as well as 105 
information on corrupt enforcers, have the potential to exert profound effects on levels of 106 
cooperation and corruption. 107 
 108 
2. Model 109 
2.1 Harvesters and enforcers, their strategies and payoffs 110 
Harvesters may log legally and invest efforts into maintaining a forest in a healthy state, so it 111 
can sustainably provide ecosystem services benefiting all community members. Alternatively, 112 
harvesters may log illegally, harvesting trees in an unsustainable manner to enhance their own 113 
incomes. Individually, each harvester has an incentive to engage in the unsustainable 114 
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harvesting of commonly owned forest trees. If all harvesters do so, however, the forest may 115 
eventually be lost, and every member of the community will suffer. This is a typical social 116 
dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Maintaining the forest in a 117 
healthy state requires cooperation, while illegal logging corresponds to defection. 118 
 Faced with this social dilemma, harvesters may find it necessary to hire a “rule 119 
enforcer”, who spots defecting harvesters and fines them. We model this situation in a 120 
minimalistic way by assuming that pairs of harvesters can commit to being monitored, and 121 
potentially punished, by an enforcer. Alternatively, harvesters might be tempted to bribe the 122 
enforcer, so as to enable them to cheat on their co-players with impunity. When a significant 123 
fraction of enforcers are corrupt, harvesters may benefit from refusing to commit to paying 124 
for an, then often useless, enforcer. 125 
 Considering two harvesters forming a pair, we set their baseline payoff to be the one 126 
achieved when both defect (illegal logging), and denote it by ? . If one harvester switches to 127 
cooperation (legal logging), we assume this improves both harvesters’ payoffs by b , 128 
measuring the benefits accrued from cooperation, through the improved (i.e., less degraded) 129 
ecosystem service. The payoff for a harvester who defects against a cooperating harvester 130 
thus is ??b. The cooperating player, in contrast, has to pay the cost of cooperation, causing a 131 
loss K , which measures the income reduction from restrained logging, and thus resulting in a 132 
payoff ??b ?K . We denote the net cost of cooperation by c ?K ?b, so the payoff of the 133 
cooperating harvester is ??c. If both harvesters cooperate, each of them benefits from the 134 
double improvement of the ecosystem service, and thus obtains a payoff 135 
??2b?K ? ??b?c . Hence, a cooperator pays a cost c  for providing a benefit b  for the 136 
co-player. A defector, by contrast, refuses to pay this cost, but still receives this benefit, if the 137 
co-player cooperates. This payoff scheme is regularly adopted in theoretical studies of the 138 
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evolution of cooperation: it has the structure of the donation game, which is a special case of 139 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Sigmund, 2010). 140 
 In addition to harvesters that may cooperate or defect and that may or may not be 141 
willing to commit to the enforcer service, we also consider conditional cooperators, who are 142 
willing to commit and cooperate if and only if their co-players are also willing to commit. 143 
Harvesters can only commit jointly; a single player cannot commit, just as a single party 144 
cannot sign a bilateral contract. There are thus five types of harvesters: conditional 145 
cooperators (at a fraction x1 in the harvester population), committing cooperators ( x2 ), 146 
committing defectors ( x3), non-committing cooperators ( x4 ), and non-committing defectors 147 
( x5), with 1 5 1x x? ? ? . 148 
Enforcers are of two types: honest and corrupt, at fractions y1 and y2 , respectively, in 149 
the enforcer population, with y1 ? y2 ?1. Honest enforcers refuse to receive a bribe offered by 150 
a defecting harvester, while corrupt enforcers accept the bribe and refrain from fining the 151 
defector who bribed them. 152 
 To employ an enforcer, each harvester must pay a fee s  for the enforcer’s service. If 153 
one of the harvesters refuses paying this cost, no enforcer will be employed. We assume that 154 
the penalty A  imposed on a defector is large enough to offset a defector’s benefit b  gained 155 
from a cooperator’s contribution: A ? b. We also assume that the cost s  of hiring the 156 
enforcer service is smaller than the contribution cost c : c ? s. In addition, we assume that the 157 
benefit b  exceeds the sum of the contribution cost c  and the commitment cost s , so that a 158 
conditional cooperator’s payoff is positive: b ? c ? s. A defecting harvester provides a bribe 159 
B  to a corrupt enforcer, instead of paying the penalty A . We assume that this bribe B  is 160 
smaller than the contribution cost c :c ? B. In summary, we assume A ?b ? c ? s?B and 161 
b ? c ? s. 162 
Page 8 of 45 
In our model, we assume a community association exists that performs the punishment 163 
based on the report of the rule enforcer who is observing harvesters’ behavior. The 164 
observation may be accompanied with two types of cost, the physical effort (time and 165 
resources) and the risk of retaliation by the defector, both of which are assumed to be 166 
negligible in the model. Enforcers make an effort to detect defection for either implementing 167 
their duty or taking bribe from defector. This cost is covered by fee s that guarantees positive 168 
net margin for enforcers. Additionally we assume that reporting a defector is costless for an 169 
enforcer. In certain situations, reporting defectors may incur a significant cost for enforcers, 170 
especially when defectors are not given the opportunity to approve a sanctioning beforehand, 171 
which may subsequently compel them to retaliate against those enforcers by whom they are 172 
subject to punishment. In the model studied here, the situation is quite different: harvesters 173 
are given the freedom to choose between using and not using the enforcement service, so 174 
enforcers are always consensually hired by two harvesters on the condition that they will 175 
detect defection. In such a case, we believe, the chance is small that defecting harvesters will 176 
retaliate against enforcers. 177 
 We assume no selection biases in how harvesters pair up and how a pair of harvesters 178 
chooses an enforcer. In both cases, individuals are chosen at random from the populations of 179 
harvesters and enforcers, respectively. 180 
 181 
2.2 Social learning 182 
The replicator dynamics for harvesters are given by 183 
 
dxi
dt
? xi fi x,y? ?? f? ? (1a) 184 
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for 1, ,5i ? , where f ? fi x,y? ?
i?1
5? xi  is the mean payoff of harvesters. Here, ? ?T1 5, ,x x?x  185 
and y ? y1,y2? ?T  are column vectors, where the superscript T indicates matrix transposition. 186 
The average payoff of harvester type i  is given by 187 
 
5 5
1 h, 2 c,
1 1
( , )i ij j ij j
j j
f y x y x
? ?
? ?? ?x y H H , (1b) 188 
for 1, ,5i ? . The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1b) is the product of the 189 
probability 1y  that an enforcer recruited by a pair of harvesters is honest and the mean payoff 190 
accrued by harvester type i  playing against all five harvester types j  according to their 191 
proportion jx  in the harvester population. The payoff of harvester type i  playing against 192 
harvester type j  under the supervision of an honest enforcer is h,ijH ; the matrix hH  is given 193 
in Table 1a. Analogously, the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1b) is the 194 
corresponding expression when the recruited enforcer is corrupt, using the probability y2  and 195 
the payoff matrix cH  given in Table 1b. The multiplicative determination of payoffs in Eq. 196 
(1b) reflects the assumed random assortment among harvesters and enforcers. 197 
 In a similar manner, the replicator dynamics for enforcers are given by 198 
 ? ?? ?d ,
d
i
i i
y y g g
t
? ?x y , (2a) 199 
for 1,2i? , where g ? gi x,y? ?
i?1
2? yi  is the mean payoff of enforcers. The average payoffs of 200 
honest and corrupt enforcers are given by 201 
 T1 h( , )g ??x y x E x and T2 c( , )g ??x y x E x , (2b) 202 
respectively. The two payoff matrixes hE  and cE , for honest and corrupt enforcers, 203 
respectively, are given in Tables 1c and 1d. The parameter 0? ?  measures the relative speed 204 
of change by social learning, between the population of enforcers and the population of 205 
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harvesters: if 1?? , enforcers learn more quickly than harvesters. If ?  is zero, only the 206 
harvesters learn, whilst the fractions of honest and corrupt enforcers remain fixed. 207 
 208 
2.3 Dominated strategies 209 
From Tables 1a and 1b we can see that the payoffs of committing cooperators and non-210 
committing cooperators are always less than those of conditional cooperators and non-211 
committing defectors, respectively. This implies that, invariably, committing and non-212 
committing cooperators will eventually disappear from the harvester population. Hence, we 213 
eliminate these two strategies from further analysis and focus on the following three types of 214 
harvesters: conditional cooperators, committing defectors, and non-committing defectors. 215 
 After committing and non-committing cooperators have disappeared from the 216 
population of harvesters, the only cooperative harvesters that remain are conditional 217 
cooperators: these cooperate only when their co-players are willing to hire an enforcer, which 218 
implies paying the associated cost. Thus, defecting harvesters have no chance of exploiting 219 
cooperating harvesters unless the former commit to hiring an enforcer. Under these 220 
circumstances, committing defectors may be superior to non-committing defectors. 221 
 222 
3. Outcomes of social learning 223 
Once committing and non-committing cooperators have disappeared from the harvester 224 
population, the fractions of the three remaining types of harvesters satisfy x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1. 225 
The state of the harvester population can thus be represented as a point within the triangle 226 
x1, x3, x5? ? x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1? ?. Similarly, the fractions of the two types of enforcers satisfy 227 
y1 ? y2 ?1. The state of the enforcer population can thus be represented as a point along the 228 
unit interval. Using the Cartesian product of these two sets, we can therefore represent the 229 
joint dynamics of harvesters and enforcers within a triangular prism, as illustrated in Fig. 1a. 230 
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 231 
3.1 Fixed enforcer fractions 232 
We first consider the dynamics of the three harvester types when the fractions of the two 233 
enforcer types are fixed ( ? ? 0). For this case, we find 234 
 3
1
d 0
d
x
t x
?  if 
1 1y y? , (3a) 235 
 3
1
d 0
d
x
t x
?  if 
1 1y y? , (3b) 236 
where ˜ y1 ? c ?B? ? A ?B? ? is the critical fraction of honest enforcers (Appendix A). Hence, 237 
we can distinguish between the following two cases: 238 
? Case 1. For y1 ? ˜ y1, Eq. (3a) indicates that the abundance of conditional cooperators 239 
monotonically decreases relative to that of committing defectors (Fig. 1b). Any 240 
trajectory starting within the triangle x1, x3, x5? ? x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1? ? thus approaches the 241 
triangle’s edge on which x1 ? 0. Along this edge, dynamics are given by 242 
dx3 dt ? x32 1? x3? ? ?s ? Ay1 ?Bry2? ?? 0, which shows that the non-committing 243 
defectors eventually take over the entire harvester population. 244 
? Case 2. For y1 ? ˜ y1, Eq. (3b) indicates that the abundance of conditional cooperators 245 
monotonically increases relative to that of committing defectors (Fig. 1c). Any 246 
trajectory starting within the triangle thus approaches the triangle’s edge on which 247 
x3 ? 0. Along this edge, dynamics are given by dx5 dt ? ? b ?c ? s? ?x5 1? x5? ?2 ? 0, 248 
which shows that the conditional cooperators eventually take over the entire harvester 249 
population. 250 
 251 
3.2 Dynamic enforcer fractions 252 
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Now we consider the case in which the dynamics of the enforcers occurs at a rate that is 253 
equivalent to that of the harvesters ( ? ? 1). Figure 1a shows trajectories of the resultant 254 
dynamics. Over time, the fraction of honest and corrupt enforcers changes according to the 255 
replicator dynamics 256 
 1 3 1 3 1 1
d 2 ( ) (1 )
d
y Bx x x y y
t
? ? ? ? . (4) 257 
As the payoff of corrupt enforcers always exceeds that of honest enforcers, the fraction of 258 
corrupt enforcers always increases over time, dy1 dt ? 0. Surprisingly, however, the corrupt 259 
enforcers do not take over the entire enforcer population, but instead end up reaching an 260 
intermediate value that depends on the initial condition. 261 
 For our further analysis, we consider the one-dimensional set 262 
x, y? ? x1 ?1, x3 ? x5 ? 0, ˜ y1 ? y1 ?1? ?, which we call the “cooperative line segment of 263 
equilibria” (CLSE). On this line segment, the harvester and enforcer populations are 264 
stationary, so the CLSE describes a continuum of equilibria of the joint dynamics. Moreover, 265 
all harvesters are conditional cooperators. Analogously, we call the set 266 
x, y? ? x5 ?1, x1 ? x3 ? 0, 0 ? y1 ? ˜ y1? ? the “defective line segment of equilibria” (DLSE). 267 
Along the DLSE, all harvesters are non-committing defectors. Both of these sets attract 268 
trajectories from the interior of the prism. 269 
 When the dynamics approach either the CLSE or the DLSE, the rate of change in y1 270 
slows down to zero, as shown by Eq. (4). Near the CLSE, y1 changes even more slowly than 271 
the harvester composition, so trajectories converge to the CLSE orthogonally, as shown in 272 
Fig. 1d and derived in Appendix A. Hence, although y1 always decreases over time, it 273 
converges to a positive level, instead of vanishing to zero. Other values of ?  lead to similar 274 
results. 275 
 276 
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3.3 Domains of attraction 277 
To illustrate the domains of attraction associated with the two line segments of equilibria, we 278 
trace trajectories starting from 100 randomly chosen points in the interior of the prism. In this 279 
way, Fig. 1a shows how social learning in the harvester and enforcer populations leads to one 280 
of just two possible outcomes: starting from the 100 randomly distributed initial conditions, 281 
72 trajectories (shown in green) converge to the CLSE, whereas the remaining 28 trajectories 282 
(shown in orange) converge to the DLSE. The joint social dynamics of the two populations 283 
thus lead to the coexistence either of conditionally cooperating harvesters with relatively 284 
honest enforcers, or of defecting harvesters with relatively corrupt enforcers. 285 
 Fig. 1e shows the fraction of trajectories leading to the CLSE as a function of the 286 
critical fraction 1y  of honest enforcers. The former fraction always monotonically decreases 287 
with 1y . When enforcers do not learn at all ( 0? ? ), the fraction equals 1? ˜ y1, while when 288 
enforcers learn slowly ( ? ? 0), the fraction remains close to 1? ˜ y1. When enforcers learn as 289 
quickly as harvesters ( 1?? ), the fraction of trajectories converging to the CLSE is 290 
considerably smaller than 1? ˜ y1 (once ˜ y1 exceeds about 0.2), because y1 decreases with time, 291 
as shown by Eq. (4), so many trajectories can reach the DSLE. Independently of ? , the 292 
considered fraction may become as low 0 ( 1? ), but can never exceed 1? ˜ y1. 293 
 Remarkably, a fraction of honest enforcers can always persist, even though corrupt 294 
enforcers invariably obtain a higher payoff than honest enforcers in the interior of the prism. 295 
This is because the harvester dynamics always take trajectories to one of the prism edges 296 
where honest and corrupt enforcers are doing equally well. Along the CLSE, the residual 297 
fraction of honest enforcers is high enough to enable full cooperation among the harvesters. 298 
 299 
4. Effects of strategy exploration 300 
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We now consider what happens when players have the possibility of randomly exploring 301 
alternative strategies, unaffected by how this affects their payoffs. Such exploration is thus 302 
qualitatively different from the social learning by imitating successful strategies, as described 303 
by the standard replicator dynamics in Eqs. (1) and (2). In models of population genetics, 304 
exploration occurs through random genetic mutations among a given set of alleles, whereas in 305 
models of social learning, such as in those considered here, exploration occurs when players 306 
try out alternative behaviors by randomly switching among a given set of strategies. 307 
 We assume that the exploration rate of the three harvester types is given by a small 308 
constant ? , and that harvesters switch with equal probability to one of the two other 309 
strategies. Thus, e.g., a conditional cooperator may change into a committing defector or into 310 
a non-committing defector, with both changes occurring at the rate ? 2. We stress that this 311 
assumption of equal exploration rates among harvesters is not important, and does not affect 312 
the further analysis. By contrast, it will prove important to consider asymmetric exploration 313 
rates between the two enforcer types, which we denote by ? i for 1,2i? . To account for 314 
exploration, the replicator dynamics of harvesters, originally given by Eq. (1a), are now given 315 
by 316 
 
dxi
dt
? xi fi ? f? ?? ?xi ? ?2 1? xi? ?, (5a) 317 
for i ?1,3,5, where f i  is the payoff of harvester type i , given by Eq. (1b) with x2 ? x4 ? 0. 318 
Likewise, the replicator dynamics of enforcers, originally given by Eq. (2a), are now given by 319 
 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
d ( )
d
y y g g y y
t
? ?? ? ? ? , (5b) 320 
 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
d ( )
d
y y g g y y
t
? ?? ? ? ? , (5c) 321 
where ig  is the fitness of enforcer type i , given by Eq. (2b) with x2 ? x4 ? 0. 322 
 323 
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4.1 Symmetric strategy exploration 324 
We first consider the case of symmetric strategy exploration, ? ??1 ??2. Fig. 2a and 2b 325 
illustrate the resultant dynamics in the prism (Fig. 2a) and as a projection onto a vertical plane 326 
through the top prism edge (Fig. 2b). Crucially, the bistability disappears, giving way to 327 
global stability: starting from any initial condition, the dynamics converge to the same 328 
equilibrium. 329 
 Even trajectories starting from high frequencies of corruption converge to the unique 330 
equilibrium, at which almost all harvesters are conditional cooperators. This result may be 331 
understood by first considering harvester populations dominated either by conditional 332 
cooperators ( x1 ?1, x3 ? x5 ? 0) or by non-committing defectors ( x1 ? x3 ? 0, x5 ?1). The 333 
corresponding prism edges are line segments of equilibria, as honest and corrupt enforcers 334 
receive the same payoffs. The first terms on the right-hand sides of Eqs. (5b) and (5c) 335 
accordingly vanish, resulting in a stable equilibrium with a fraction *1 2 1 2( )y ? ? ?? ?  of 336 
honest enforcers. Since this equilibrium is determined purely by strategy exploration, and not 337 
at all affected by social learning, we call it an “exploration-induced equilibrium”. For the 338 
symmetric case shown in Fig. 2a and 2b, we naturally obtain *1 0.5y ? . For 0? ? , however, 339 
the harvester population cannot remain confined to the aforementioned edges with x1 ?1 or 340 
x5 ?1. Instead, rare strategy exploration in the harvester population will drive it slightly away 341 
from those edges. As a result, corrupt enforcers will receive a slightly higher payoff than 342 
honest enforcers, decreasing the equilibrium fraction of honest enforcers slightly below *1y . In 343 
accordance with this prediction, the numerically calculated equilibrium for the case shown in 344 
Fig. 2a and 2b (where ? ? 0.002) is located at y1 ? 0.45 (instead of at *1 0.5y ? ). 345 
 When harvesters are confronted with a high frequency of corruption, their social 346 
learning first leads to a high fraction of non-committing defectors, after which strategy 347 
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exploration by enforcers enables an escape to the globally stable equilibrium featuring a very 348 
large fraction of conditionally cooperating harvesters. The subtlety of this finding lies in the 349 
fact that it is only after social learning has made non-committing defectors dominant that very 350 
small exploration rates suffice to overcome, for *1 1y y? , the drive towards increased 351 
corruption. 352 
 353 
4.2 Asymmetric strategy exploration 354 
In general, if the exploration-induced equilibrium *1y  exceeds the corruption threshold 1y , the 355 
dynamics will converge to an equilibrium close to the CLSE, characterized by a dominance of 356 
conditional cooperators. 357 
 In contrast, if the exploration-induced equilibrium is smaller than the corruption 358 
threshold, the dynamics will converge to an equilibrium close to the DLSE, characterized by 359 
the dominance of non-committing defectors. An example is shown in Fig. 2c and 2d, for 360 
asymmetric exploration rates in the harvester population, ?1?6?. The exploration-induced 361 
equilibrium is then located at y1
* ?1 7 ? 0.14 , i.e., outside the CLSE. In Fig. 2c and 2d, the 362 
globally stable equilibrium is located at y1 ? 0.13 (as expected, this is slightly below the 363 
exploration-induced equilibrium) and x1, x3, x5? ?? 0.06, 0.08, 0.86? ? (as expected, the 364 
harvester population is dominated by non-committing defectors). 365 
 Small exploration rates among the three harvester types do not alter outcomes. In 366 
contrast, as we have seen, the exploration rates between the two enforcer types have a 367 
profound effect on outcomes, even if they are very small. It is the ratio of the two enforcer 368 
exploration rates that determines whether the harvester-enforcer system ends up with 369 
cooperation (Fig. 2a and 2b) or defection (Fig. 2c and 2d). The higher the enforcers’ tendency 370 
to switch from corrupt to honest, the likelier is a cooperative outcome. This effect can be 371 
achieved by means not mechanistically described by our model: important options for 372 
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achieving such an effect would be education of the enforcers, appeals to the long-term 373 
interests of enforcers, or incentives provided to enforcers by a higher authority. 374 
 Since the payoff of corrupt enforcers is never smaller than that of honest enforcers, it 375 
is tempting to think that corrupt enforcers will always dominate, and that a small exploration 376 
rate cannot have much effect on the outcomes. However, through social learning among the 377 
harvesters, harvesters paying bribes disappear quickly, so the harvester population becomes 378 
dominated either by conditional cooperators (who do not pay bribes) or by non-committing 379 
defectors (who do not commit to the service of an enforcer). Under these circumstances, the 380 
payoff difference between the two enforcer types vanishes. Hence, even if the exploration 381 
rates of enforcers are very low, they can be decisive for the outcome. 382 
 383 
5. Effects of information on corrupt enforcers 384 
In the basic model, once dynamics converge to the DLSE, the harvester-enforcer system is 385 
trapped. A possible mechanism to escape this situation is the sharing of information 386 
concerning the honesty of enforcers, which we thus examine next. 387 
 When the enforcer’s type is known, opportunistic versions of conditional cooperators 388 
and committing defectors will act in different ways. Specifically, if the enforcer is known to 389 
be corrupt, an opportunistic conditional cooperator will choose defection and refuse the 390 
enforcer’s service, while if the enforcer is honest, an opportunistic committing defector will 391 
refuse the enforcer’s service. Hence opportunistic conditional cooperators behave like non-392 
committing defectors if the enforcer is known to be corrupt, while opportunistic committing 393 
defectors behave like non-committing defectors if the enforcer is known to be honest. 394 
 We assume that honest enforcers are always known to be honest to all harvesters, 395 
whereas corrupt enforcers are identified as being corrupt with probability p?1. This 396 
assumption is based on the understanding that harvesters might hesitate more to share 397 
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negative information about an enforcer’s corruption than positive information about an 398 
enforcer’s honesty. Such a difference could ultimately be caused by differential personal risks 399 
resulting from sharing positive or negative information. An alternative mechanism is that 400 
harvesters might assume an enforcer to be honest until proved otherwise. We assume that 401 
information on corrupt enforcers is obtained by harvesters independently, and without extra 402 
cost. 403 
 We thus have to consider three possible constellations in games between two 404 
committing harvesters and a corrupt enforcer: the enforcer is evaluated as honest by both 405 
harvesters with probability 2(1 )p? , evaluated as honest by one harvester but as corrupt by the 406 
other with probability 2p 1? p? ?, and evaluated as corrupt by both harvesters with probability 407 
2p . 408 
 If all enforcers are honest, only pairs of opportunistic conditional cooperators use the 409 
enforcer service, because all opportunistic committing defectors will not dare to commit. If all 410 
enforcers are corrupt, opportunistic conditional cooperators mistakenly assume that an 411 
enforcer is honest with probability (1 )p? , while opportunistic committing defectors 412 
recognize the enforcer as being corrupt with probability p. In this way, we obtain the payoffs 413 
for the harvesters shown in Table 2a. (The dynamics resulting among the three harvester types 414 
when all enforcers are either honest or corrupt are discussed in Appendix B and shown in Fig. 415 
4.) 416 
 The payoffs for the enforcers depend on the fraction of committing players. Honest 417 
enforcers are paid 2s  by pairs of opportunistic conditional cooperators, while corrupt 418 
enforcers benefit from various combinations of committing harvesters. In this way, we obtain 419 
the payoffs for the enforcers shown in Table 2b (for the derivation, see Appendix C). 420 
 Fig. 3a illustrates the resultant dynamics in the prism. On the edge along which 421 
opportunistic conditional cooperators dominate ( 1 1x ? ), honest enforcers receive a higher 422 
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payoff than corrupt enforcers, because g1 ? g2 ? 2s 1? 1? p? ?2? ?? 0. On this edge, therefore, 423 
the fraction of honest enforcers increases towards 1 1y ? . In contrast, on the edge along which 424 
opportunistic committing defectors dominate ( 3 1x ? ), honest enforcers receive a smaller 425 
payoff than corrupt enforcers, because g1 ? g2 ? ?2sp2 s?B? ? ? 0. On this edge, therefore, the 426 
fraction of corrupt enforcers increase towards 2 1y ? . 427 
 By comparing Fig. 3a with Fig. 1a, we thus see that information on corrupt enforcers 428 
favors the evolution of cooperation. Again starting from 100 randomly chosen initial 429 
conditions, 95 trajectories end up with cooperative harvesting, compared with 72 trajectories 430 
when there is no such information. This quantitative comparison obviously depends on the 431 
parameters, but the general trend is robust: more information makes cooperation more likely. 432 
 Fig. 3b illustrates the fraction of trajectories that end up with cooperative harvesting as 433 
a function of the probability p of recognizing corrupt enforcers. For all values of p , 434 
information on corrupt enforcers greatly increases the fraction of cooperative outcomes, 435 
almost to its maximal level. The figure also shows that small and large probabilities p  favor 436 
maximally cooperative harvesting, while intermediate probabilities work slightly less well 437 
(this is because, for intermediate p , the harm 2(1 ) ( )p p y c s? ? ?  done by opportunistic 438 
committing defectors to opportunistic conditional cooperators, as shown in Table 2a, is not 439 
negligible, resulting in a reduced level of cooperation). We emphasize that a vanishing value 440 
of p  is not equivalent to the basic model without information on corrupt enforcers, as even 441 
for 0p?  honest enforcers remain known with certainty in the extended model. 442 
 443 
6. Discussion 444 
In this paper, we have analyzed evolutionary game dynamics describing the interplay of 445 
harvesters tempted by illegal logging and enforcers tempted by corruption. Through mutual 446 
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agreement, a pair of harvesters may hire an enforcer to check whether each of them is logging 447 
legally. This is a minimalistic form of a social contract. An honest enforcer promotes 448 
cooperation by penalizing defecting harvesters. Under the oversight of an honest enforcer, 449 
harvesters can either cooperate and pay the cost of legal logging, or defect and pay the penalty 450 
imposed by the enforcer. When the enforcer is corrupt, harvesters have an additional option: 451 
they can defect and pay a bribe to the enforcer in order to avoid having to pay a fine. 452 
 Analyzing the replicator dynamics of this harvester-enforcer game, we can draw the 453 
following conclusions. First, the dynamics resulting from social learning (by imitating players 454 
receiving higher payoffs) is often bistable (Fig. 1a and 1d), featuring two line segments of 455 
equilibria. As one outcome, the harvester-enforcer dynamics may converge to a defective line 456 
segment of equilibria (DLSE). At each point of the DLSE, all harvesters defect and pay bribes 457 
to the enforcers, most of whom are corrupt. Harvesters, in such a situation, will stop to hire an 458 
enforcer, and the forest’s ecosystem services may soon be lost through unrestrained illegal 459 
logging. Bistability implies that there is also another outcome, which arises when the 460 
harvester-enforcer dynamics converge to a cooperative line segment of equilibria (CLSE). At 461 
each point of the CLSE, all harvesters are cooperative, and many enforcers are honest. 462 
Although some enforcers are corrupt even along the CLSE, there are sufficiently many honest 463 
enforcers to prevent the spread of illegal logging. 464 
 Second, a fraction of enforcers always remain honest in spite of the fact that the payoff 465 
for corrupt enforcers is invariably higher than that for honest enforcers if all harvester types 466 
are present. This counterintuitive result arises because the payoff difference caused by bribery 467 
disappears when all harvesters are cooperative and do not pay bribes, or when all harvesters 468 
are defective and do not commit to the enforcer service. The fraction of honest enforcers thus 469 
remaining may suffice to foster perfect cooperation among the harvesters. 470 
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 Third, a small rate of strategy exploration can drastically change the harvester-471 
enforcer dynamics. Both the bistability of the dynamics and the line segments of equilibria 472 
disappear. Depending on asymmetries in the exploration rates of enforcers, the dynamics 473 
converge either to a globally stable cooperative equilibrium (Fig. 2a and 2b) or to a globally 474 
stable defective equilibrium (Fig. 2c and 2d). When corruption is rife, social learning among 475 
harvesters leaves enforcers mostly deprived of fees and bribes, and it is in such near-neutral 476 
situations that said asymmetries can unfold their unexpectedly consequential impact. 477 
 Fourth, information about the honesty of enforcers has a large impact on whether or 478 
not cooperative harvesting can be sustained. If such information is available, the harvester-479 
enforcer dynamics converge to a regime of cooperative harvesting for a much broader range 480 
of initial conditions (Fig. 3). 481 
 The harvester-enforcer game studied here is an example of the evolution of 482 
cooperation by punishment, which has been a prominent research focus of evolutionary game 483 
theory, especially throughout the last decade (e.g., Sigmund et al., 2001; Gardner and West, 484 
2004; Brandt et al., 2005; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006, 2009; Hauert et al., 2007; Sigmund et 485 
al., 2010). Most studies explore situations in which players can inflict punishment on each 486 
other. Such so-called ‘peer punishment’ can be effective under certain conditions (Fehr and 487 
Gächter, 2000). However, it can easily be subverted by asocial punishment, not directed 488 
against the defectors, but rather against the cooperators (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Denant-489 
Boemont et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 490 
2012). While the self-justice involved in peer punishment may be important for the ancestral 491 
establishment of cooperation, it is not normally used in developed societies to promote 492 
cooperation (Guala, 2010). In such societies, the act of punishment is often delegated to an 493 
institution, such as a janitor, a sheriff, or a police force (e.g., Yamagishi, 1984; Ostrom, 494 
2005). This implies a kind of social contract: players abstain from self-justice and instead 495 
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commit to an authority. To secure the investments required for establishing and maintaining 496 
such an authority, players may voluntarily pool their resources (resulting in so-called ‘pool 497 
punishment’; e.g., Sigmund et al., 2010), or the sanctioning institution may levy an 498 
inescapable tax from all players (resulting in so-called ‘institutional punishment’; e.g., Sasaki 499 
et al., 2012). Theoretical models and lab experiments show that, whereas institutionalized 500 
forms of sanctioning are generally less efficient than self-justice, they tend to be more stable 501 
(Kamei et al., 2011; Markussen et al., 2011; Puttermann et al., 2011; Sigmund et al., 2011; 502 
Traulsen et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). The voluntary commitment of harvesters to an 503 
enforcer service we have considered here is a minimalistic form of a sanctioning institution 504 
organized according to the principles of pool punishment. 505 
 Just as self-justice is threatened by the escalation of conflicts between players, so 506 
institutionalized sanctioning is threatened by corruption. If punishment is not directed 507 
consistently and exclusively against defectors, it subverts cooperation. Corruption is a 508 
pervasive feature of many societies, and can be seen as one of the major obstacles to 509 
cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in terms of evolutionary 510 
game theory that addresses the threat of corruption both among the users and the providers of 511 
sanctions. It is clear that we have studied here merely a first simple model. In extensions of 512 
this work, it will be desirable to remove some of its most obvious limitations. In particular, it 513 
will be interesting to consider finite populations (the replicator equations used here describe 514 
the limiting case of infinitely large populations), larger teams of harvesters (the harvester 515 
pairs examined here are the smallest social unit in which cooperation can conceivably be 516 
established and enforced), and the effect of spatial distribution and localized interaction (the 517 
well-mixed populations studied here are a worst-case scenario, as they enable defectors to 518 
suffer less from their deeds). As another extension, and a promising way of promoting the 519 
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honesty of enforcers, we would like to incorporate a tax to be paid to the enforcers in 520 
proportion to the payoffs received by the harvesters, an idea inspired by Yamagishi (1986). 521 
 Our study suggests several policy-related implications for the management of forest 522 
ecosystems. The first stems from the inherent bistability of the harvester-enforcer dynamics. 523 
While many initial conditions of the harvester-enforcer dynamics will smoothly lead to the 524 
dominance of cooperative harvesters, others lead to the dominance of defectors. This means 525 
that, once defectors prevail, it will usually be very difficult to change this situation, unless a 526 
strong effort is made. This may be one of the reasons why illegal logging is prevalent in some 527 
countries, but not in others. People living in a highly cooperative society tend to find it 528 
difficult to imagine the situation in a country where defection and corruption are very 529 
prevalent, and vice versa. This is because the described bistability fundamentally affects both 530 
economic payoffs and social expectations about the rule adherence of other players. To 531 
promote a better understanding of why investing into the establishment of cooperative 532 
harvesting regimes will ultimately be worthwhile, we need to strengthen activities fostering 533 
insights into successes achieved, and ‘best practices’ adopted, by different communities and 534 
countries. 535 
 Second, the education of enforcers is likely to have a strong effect on the likelihood 536 
that cooperative harvesting can get established. Since it is the harvesters who potentially 537 
engage in illegal logging, cutting an excess of trees, it is tempting to focus attention on their 538 
behavior. According to our analysis, however, investing into changing the conduct of 539 
enforcers could be far more important and effective. This conclusion has a mathematical 540 
basis: in our model, social learning among harvesters causes enforcers to be mostly deprived 541 
of fees and bribes, equalizing the economic incentives for honest and corrupt enforcers and 542 
thus preparing the ground for even a weak predilection by enforcers to switch from corrupt to 543 
honest behavior, rather than vice versa, to be very effective in determining the final outcome. 544 
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Such a predilection can be fostered by education, incentives, or other externally imposed 545 
factors. Even a small bias among enforcers to choose honesty over corruption will thus have a 546 
profound influence. Thus, it might indeed be cost-efficient to focus educational efforts and 547 
incentives provided by governments on the enforcers. 548 
 Third, the availability of information on the honesty and reliability of each enforcer 549 
has a huge impact, greatly enhancing the likelihood of cooperative harvesting. Interestingly, 550 
this conclusion holds even if the chance of identifying a corrupt enforcer is less than perfect. 551 
This suggests that any measures governments could take to make the sharing of information 552 
about corrupt enforcers anonymous, risk-free, and widely accessible would make an 553 
important contribution to promoting cooperative harvesting. 554 
 We close by emphasizing the importance of further studies on corruption. Corruption 555 
is one of the most serious scourges in economic development and ecosystem management, 556 
possibly even more devastating than ignorance. The model studied here may be too simple to 557 
be immediately applicable to particular cases, but it captures essential aspects of the perennial 558 
problems associated with corruption. We hope that this study will stimulate future theoretical 559 
work on the mechanisms underlying the spread and curbing of corruption. 560 
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Appendices 575 
Appendix A: Analysis of the basic model 576 
Here we consider the dynamics of social learning among the three non-dominated harvester 577 
strategies when the fractions of enforcer types are fixed. 578 
 The payoffs of the three non-dominated harvester strategies – conditional cooperators, 579 
committing defectors, and non-committing defectors – (Table 1a and 1b) are, respectively, 580 
 
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
1 1 3
3 1 2 1 1 2 3
5
,
,
0.
r
f b c s x c s x
f b s Ay B y x s Ay By x
f
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
 (A.1) 581 
By setting ? ? b?c ? s, ? ? ?c ? s, ? ? b ? s? Ay1 ?By2 , and ? ? ?s? Ay1 ?By2 , we obtain 582 
f1 ??x1 ??x3 , and f3 ??x1 ??x3 . The mean fitness is f ? f1x1 ? f3x3, since f5?0. 583 
 584 
A.1 Global dynamics of harvesters for fixed enforcer fractions 585 
We consider the dynamics of the two fractions x1 and x3, noting that x5 ?1? x1 ? x3, 586 
 
dx1
dt
? x1 f1 ? f ? ?? x1 f1 1? x1? ?? f3x3? ?, (A.2a) 587 
 
dx3
dt
? x3 f3 ? f ? ?? x3 ? f1x1 ? f3 1? x3? ?? ?. (A.2b) 588 
From this, we obtain the dynamics of the ratio x 3 x 1 as 589 
 d
dt
x3
x1
? x3 1? x3x1
??
????
??
????c ? Ay1 ? By2?, 590 
which implies that 591 
 If c ? Ay1 ?By2 , the ratio x 3 x 1 increases over time, whereas (A.3a) 592 
 If c ? Ay1 ?By2 , the ratio x 3 x 1 decreases over time. (A.3b) 593 
We denote by ˜ y1 ? c ?B? ? A ?B? ? the critical fraction of honest enforcers. If y1 ? ˜ y1, the ratio 594 
x 3 x 1 increases over time and diverges to infinity, implying that all trajectories starting from 595 
Page 27 of 45 
the inside of the triangle x1, x3, x5? ? x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1? ? approach the line x1?0 . In contrast, if 596 
y1 ? ˜ y1, the ratio x 3 x 1 decreases over time and converges to zero, implying that all 597 
trajectories starting from the inside of the triangle approach the line x3?0. 598 
 Note that the argument above holds for all points within the triangle, so the dynamics 599 
of the ratio x 3 x 1 provides information on the global dynamics among all three harvester 600 
strategies. 601 
 602 
A.2 Dynamics of harvesters along edges for fixed enforcer fractions 603 
Next, we examine the dynamics along the three edges of the triangle, where one of the three 604 
non-dominated harvester strategies is absent. 605 
 (1) On the line 1 5 3( 0, 1 )x x x? ? ? , we have the following dynamics for x3, 606 
 
dx3
dt
? ?s ? Ay1 ?By2? ?x32 1? x3? ?? 0. (A.4a) 607 
Hence an orbit leads from x1, x3, x5? ?? 0,1, 0? ? to 0, 0,1? ? . 608 
 (2) On the line 3 1 5( 0, 1 )x x x? ? ? , we have the following dynamics for x5, 609 
 
dx5
dt
? ? b ? c ? s? ?x5 1? x5? ?2 ? 0 . (A.4b) 610 
Hence an orbit leads from x1, x3, x5? ?? 0, 0,1? ? to 1, 0, 0? ? . 611 
 Combining Eqs. (A.3a) and (A.3b) with Eqs. (A.4a) or (A.4b), we obtain the 612 
conclusion described in the main text: if y1 ? ˜ y1, all trajectories within the triangle converge to 613 
1, 0, 0? ? , whilst if y1 ? ˜ y1, all trajectories converge to ? ?0, 0,1 . 614 
 (3) On the line 5 3 1( 0, 1 )x x x? ? ? , we have the following dynamics for x1, 615 
 
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 2
d 1
d
1 .
x x x x
t
x x c Ay By
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
 (A.4c) 616 
Page 28 of 45 
This expression is positive for y1 ? ˜ y1 and negative for y1 ? ˜ y1. Hence, an orbit leads from 617 
? ?0,1,0  to 1,0,0? ? for y1 ? ˜ y1, and in the opposite direction for y1 ? ˜ y1. 618 
 619 
A.3 Dynamics of harvesters around vertices for fixed enforcer fractions 620 
We now examine the dynamics around the three vertices of the triangle, where one of the 621 
three non-dominated harvester strategies is much more common than the other two. 622 
 (1) First, we analyze the dynamics in the vicinity of the vertex ? ?1 3 51, 0x x x? ? ?  by 623 
considering the two directions in which this vertex can be left, by increasing 3x  or by 624 
increasing 5x . The former happens when the following rate is positive, 625 
 
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
3
3 3
3 1 1 3 3 1 3
3
3 1 2
d
d
= 1
h.o.t.
h.o.t. ,
x x f f
t
x x x x x x x
x
x c Ay By
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
 (A.5a) 626 
where the abbreviation “h.o.t.” stands for higher-order terms in 3x . Near the considered 627 
vertex, this rate is positive for c ? Ay1 ?By2 , and negative for c ? Ay1 ?By2 . In a similar 628 
manner, we examine 629 
 
? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
5
5 5
5
5
d
d
= h.o.t.
h.o.t. ,
x x f f
t
x
x b c s
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
 (A.5b) 630 
where the abbreviation “h.o.t.” stands for higher-order terms in 5x . This rate is always 631 
negative near the considered vertex. 632 
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 Hence, the vertex ? ?1 3 51, 0x x x? ? ?  is a stable node if y2 ? A ?c? ? A ?B? ?, and a 633 
saddle (and thus unstable) if y2 ? A ?c? ? A ?B? ?. When the vertex is unstable, it is the 634 
fraction 3x  of committing defectors that increases upon departure from the vertex. 635 
 (2) Next, we analyze the dynamics in the vicinity of the vertex ? ?3 1 51, 0x x x? ? ?  by 636 
examining 637 
 
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1
1 1
1
1 1 2
d
d
h.o.t.
h.o.t. .
x x f f
t
x
x c Ay By
? ?
? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
 (A.6a) 638 
Near the considered vertex, this rate is negative when c ? Ay1 ?By2 , and positive when 639 
c ? Ay1 ?By2 . In a similar manner, we examine 640 
 
? ?
? ?
? ?
5
5 5
5
5 1 2
d
d
= h.o.t.
h.o.t. ,
x x f f
t
x
x s Ay By
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
 (A.6b) 641 
which is always positive near the considered vertex. 642 
 Hence, the vertex ? ?3 1 51, 0x x x? ? ?  is always unstable. It is an unstable node if 643 
y2 ? A ?c? ? A ?B? ?, and a saddle if y2 ? A ?c? ? A ?B? ?. 644 
 (3) Finally, we analyze the dynamics in the vicinity of the vertex ? ?5 1 31, 0x x x? ? ? , 645 
which can be inferred from the global dynamics investigated above: for y1 ? ˜ y1, the ratio 646 
x 3 x 1 increases over time. From this, we can conclude that all trajectories starting from the 647 
triangle’s interior first approach to the edge 1 0x ?  and then converge to the considered vertex 648 
(Fig. 1b). Yet, this vertex itself is unstable, because 1x  grows along the edge x3?0. In 649 
contrast, for y1 ? ˜ y1, the ratio x 3 x 1 decreases over time, so the fraction 1x  of conditional 650 
cooperators increases along all trajectories starting from the triangle’s interior (Fig. 1c). 651 
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 652 
A.4 Summary of the dynamics of harvesters for fixed enforcer fractions 653 
Throughout the analyses in Sections A.1 to A.3 above, the deduced switches of stability all 654 
occur at the same critical fraction of honest enforcers, ˜ y1 ? c ?B? ? A ?B? ?. In summary, we 655 
can therefore distinguish between the following two fundamental cases: 656 
? Case 1. When y1 ? ˜ y1, the vertex x1, x3, x5? ?? 1, 0, 0? ? is a saddle that is unstable in the 657 
direction of increasing 3x , the vertex x1, x3, x5? ?? 0,1, 0? ? is a saddle that is unstable 658 
in the direction of increasing 5x , and the vertex x1, x3, x5? ?? 0, 0,1? ? is a higher-order 659 
equilibrium that attracts almost all trajectories in its vicinity, although it is unstable in 660 
the direction of increasing 1x . For this case, trajectories within the triangle are 661 
topologically equivalent to the those shown in Fig. 1b for 1 0y ? . 662 
? Case 2. When y1 ? ˜ y1, the vertex x1, x3, x5? ?? 1, 0, 0? ? is a stable node, the vertex 663 
x1, x3, x5? ?? 0,1, 0? ? is an unstable node, and the vertex x1, x3, x5? ?? 0, 0,1? ? is a 664 
higher-order equilibrium that repels almost all trajectories in its vicinity toward the 665 
direction of increasing x1, although it is stable in the direction of decreasing 3x . For 666 
this case, trajectories within the triangle are topologically equivalent to those shown in 667 
Fig. 1c for 1 1y ? . 668 
 669 
A.5 Joint dynamics of harvesters and enforcers 670 
Now we consider the dynamics of y1 and 2 11y y? ? , 671 
 
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1
1 1 1 2
1 1 3 1 3
d 1
d
1 1 2 .
y y y g g
t
y y Bx x x
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
 (A.7) 672 
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We refer to the set of equilibria x, y? ? x1 ?1, x3 ? x5 ? 0, ˜ y1 ? y1 ?1? ? as the “cooperative line 673 
segment of equilibria” (CLSE), while we refer to the set of equilibria 674 
? ?? ?5 1 3 1 1, 1, 0, 0x x x y y? ? ? ? ?x y  as the “defective line segment of equilibria” (DLSE). 675 
On both line segments, the three non-dominated harvester strategies are stationary, and also 676 
the fraction of honest enforcers remains constant, Eq. (A.7). 677 
 Near the CLSE, x3 decreases first and then x5 decreases exponentially, as predicted 678 
by Eq. (A.5). The change in y1 is thus very slow, and becomes negligible during the final 679 
approach toward the CLSE. Hence, trajectories converge to any point along the CLSE from a 680 
direction that is vertical to the CLSE. 681 
 Near the DLSE, x1 decreases first and then x3 decreases very slowly, as a hyperbolic 682 
(algebraic) function of time, ? ? ? ?23 1 2 3 3d d 1 0x t s Ay By x x? ? ? ? ? ? . During this approach to 683 
the DLSE, y1 decreases according to ? ?? ? 21 1 1 3d d 1 1 2 0y t y y Bx? ? ? ? . Comparing these two 684 
rates of convergence, we obtain the limiting slope of the trajectories as 685 
 
? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
2
1 2 3 33 3 1 2
32
1 1 1 1 3 1 1
1d d d 1 0
d d d 1 1 2 2 1
s Ay By x xx x t s Ay By x
y y t y y Bx By y
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? , (A.8) 686 
which implies that any point on the DLSE has trajectories that converge to that point as 3x  687 
converges to zero, and that these trajectories have a positive slope given by Eq. (A.8). Note 688 
that this slope does not appear in Fig. 1d, as the vertical axis there is x1, and all trajectories 689 
converging to a point along the DLSE have a slope of zero, because x1 vanishes first. 690 
691 
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Appendix B: Effects of information on corrupt enforcers 692 
When information is available on corrupt enforcers, the payoffs of the three non-dominated 693 
harvester strategies – conditional cooperators, committing defectors, and non-committing 694 
defectors – (Table 2a) are, respectively, 695 
 
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
2
1 1 2 1 2 3
2
3 2 1 2 3
5
1 1 ,
1 ,
0.
f y y p b c s x p p y c s x
f p p y b s B x p y s B x
f
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
 (B.1) 696 
 When all enforcers are honest ( 1 1y ?  and 2 0y ? ), d x3 x1? ? dt ? x3 x1? ? f3 ? f1? ? 697 
yields 698 
 ? ? ? ?? ?? ?3 1 3 1 1d d 1 0x x t x x b c s x? ? ? ? ? , (B.2) 699 
so all trajectories within the triangle x1, x3, x5? ? x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1? ? eventually converge to 700 
1 1x ?  (Fig.4a). 701 
 Similarly, when all enforcers are corrupt ( 1 0y ?  and 2 1y ? ), Eqs. (B.1) yield, 702 
 d x3 x1? ? dt ? x3 x1? ? f3 ? f1? ?? x3 Q?R x3 x1? ?? ?, (B.2) 703 
with Q ? p b ? s ?B? ?? 1? p? ? b ?c ? s? ?? ?1? p? ? and R ? p ?s ?Br? ?? 1? p? ? ?c ? s? ?? ?p . Using the 704 
abbreviation ? ? ?Q R, we thus obtain the following classification: 705 
? Case 1. If p  is small, Q ? 0 and R ? 0 hold. From Eq. (B.2), we can then conclude 706 
that d x3 x1? ? dt ? 0 for 0 ? x3 x1 ?? , and d x3 x1? ? dt ? 0 for x3 x1 ?? . Fig. 4b 707 
illustrates this for 0.2p ? . 708 
? Case 2. If p  is intermediate, Q ? 0 and R ? 0 hold. From Eq. (B.2), we can then 709 
conclude that d x3 x1? ? dt ? 0 for all x3 x1 ? 0. Fig. 4c illustrates this for 0.34p ? . 710 
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? Case 3. If p  is large, Q ? 0 and R ? 0 hold. From Eq. (B.2), we can then conclude 711 
that d x3 x1? ? dt ? 0 for 0 ? x3 x1 ?? , and d x3 x1? ? dt ? 0 for x3 x1 ?? . Fig. 4d 712 
illustrates this for p ? 0.8. 713 
The transition between Case 1 and Case 2 occurs for Q ? 0, which implies the threshold 714 
p ? b ?c ? s? ? 2b ?2s ?c ?B? ?. The transition between Case 2 and Case 3 occurs for R ? 0, 715 
which implies the threshold p ? c ? s? ? 2s?c ?B? ?. 716 
717 
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Appendix C: Payoffs for enforcers when information on corrupt enforcers is available 718 
To determine the payoff for corrupt enforcers when information on corrupt enforcers is 719 
available, we have to examine how pairs of the three non-dominated harvester strategies act 720 
when they consider their enforcer as being corrupt (which happens with probability p ) or 721 
honest (which happens with probability 1 p? ). Considering three harvester strategies and two 722 
enforcer assessments yields six combinations. For example, opportunistic conditional 723 
cooperators regarding the enforcer as being honest occur with probability 1? p? ?x1, while 724 
opportunistic committing defectors regarding the enforcer as being corrupt occur with 725 
probability px3. 726 
 Since the two harvesters in a pair are each sampled randomly from these six 727 
combinations, we have to consider 6x6 = 36 combinations for the pair. We thus obtain the 728 
following expected payoff for a corrupt enforcer, 729 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?2 22 1 1 3 31 2 2 1 2 2 2g p x s p x px s B px s B? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? . (C.1a) 730 
The first term is the contribution when both harvesters are opportunistic conditional 731 
cooperators regarding the enforcer as being honest, in which case the payoff for the enforcer 732 
is 2s . The second term is the contribution when one harvester is an opportunistic conditional 733 
cooperator regarding the enforcer as being honest and the other is an opportunistic 734 
committing defector regarding the enforcer as being corrupt, in which case the payoff for the 735 
enforcer is 2s B? . The third term is the contribution when both harvesters are opportunistic 736 
committing defectors regarding the enforcer as being corrupt, in which case the payoff for the 737 
enforcer is 2 2s B? . For all other combinations, the enforcer receives no payoff, because at 738 
least one of the two harvesters is not willing to hire an enforcer. The payoff expression above 739 
can be rewritten as 740 
 ? ? ? ?22 1 3 1 3 32 1 2 1g s p x px B p x px px? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? , (C.1b) 741 
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which is shown in Table 2b. 742 
 Analogously, we obtain the expected payoff for an honest enforcer. In this case, the 743 
enforcer is known to be honest to both harvesters forming a pair, so we have to consider only 744 
3x3 = 9 combinations for the pair. From these pairs, the enforcer accepts no bribes and 745 
collects the fee 2s  only when both harvesters are opportunistic conditional cooperators. This 746 
yields 747 
 21 12g sx? , (C.2) 748 
which is also shown in Table 2b. 749 
750 
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Figure captions 886 
 887 
Figure 1. Dynamics of harvester cooperation and enforcer corruption in the basic model. 888 
Harvesters can be of three types (conditional cooperators, committing defectors, and non-889 
committing defectors, with fractions 1x , 3x , and 5x , respectively), while enforcers can be of 890 
two types (honest or corrupt, with fractions 1y , 2y , respectively). As x1 ? x3 ? x5 ?1 and 891 
y1 ? y2 ?1, harvester fractions change within an equilateral triangle and enforcer fractions 892 
change within the unit interval, so their joint dynamics can be envisaged in the Cartesian 893 
product of those two sets, which is a prism. The corners of this prism, as well as its two edges 894 
with 11 ?x  and x5 ?1, consist of rest points of the harvester-enforcer replicator dynamics. (a) 895 
Social learning of harvesters and enforcers can lead to two distinct outcomes, as illustrated by 896 
the trajectories originating from 100 randomly chosen initial conditions: some trajectories 897 
(thin orange lines) end up with all harvesters being non-committing defectors and most 898 
enforcers being corrupt, while other trajectories (thin green lines) end up with all harvesters 899 
being conditional cooperators and many enforcers being honest. Thus, trajectories converge to 900 
either the defective line segment of equilibria (DLSE; thick orange line) or to the cooperative 901 
line segment of equilibria (CLSE; thick green line). (b) Dynamics of the three harvester types 902 
when all enforcers are corrupt ( y1 ? 0; triangular prism face at the back of Fig. 1a). Dashed 903 
lines are contours of 3 1x x . The boundary of the triangle consists of a heteroclinic cycle: 904 
conditional cooperators can be invaded by committing defectors, who can be invaded by non-905 
committing defectors, who can be invaded by conditional cooperators. The interior of the 906 
triangle is filled with homoclinic orbits starting from and returning to the state of the harvester 907 
population comprising only non-committing defectors. Thus, arbitrarily small random shocks 908 
can lead to bursts of conditional cooperation, but these are short-lived; in the long run, non-909 
committing defectors prevail. (c) Dynamics of the three harvester types when all enforcers are 910 
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honest ( y1 ?1; triangular prism face at the front of Fig. 1a). Dashed lines again are contours of 911 
3 1x x . All trajectories converge to the equilibrium at which conditional cooperators prevail. 912 
(d) Projection of the trajectories in Fig. 1a onto the plane with 3 0x ?  (rectangular prism face 913 
at the back of Fig. 1a). In this projection, the fractions x3  and x5  are not distinguished; only 914 
their sum can be inferred as 1? x1. (e) Fraction of trajectories converging to cooperative 915 
harvesting as a function of the critical fraction of honest enforcers. Parameters: 1b ? , c ? 0.5, 916 
A ? 2, and s ? B ?0.2. 917 
 918 
Figure 2. Effects of strategy exploration. (a) Trajectories of the harvester-enforcer dynamics 919 
for symmetric exploration, originating from 100 randomly chosen initial conditions. (b) 920 
Projection of the trajectories in Fig. 2a onto the face with x 3 ? 0 . Along the lines 11 ?x  and 921 
13 ?x , which in the absence of strategy exploration contain line segments of equilibria of the 922 
harvester-enforcer dynamics, rare explorations between honest and corrupt enforcer strategies 923 
have a strong impact on the outcome. Note that trajectories starting with high frequencies of 924 
corruption also converge to the globally stable equilibrium, at which the harvester population 925 
is dominated by conditional cooperators. Many trajectories first pass through states with a 926 
high fraction of non-committing defectors, but due to the strategy exploration of enforcers, 927 
they eventually converge to a state of cooperative harvesting. (c) Trajectories of the harvester-928 
enforcer dynamics for asymmetric exploration, originating from 100 randomly chosen initial 929 
conditions. (d) Projection of the trajectories in Fig. 2c onto the face with x 3 ? 0 . The fraction 930 
of honest enforcers at the exploration-induced equilibrium y1
* lies below the critical fraction 931 
1y  of honest enforcers, implying that most harvesters eventually become non-committing 932 
defectors and most enforcers eventually become corrupt. Parameters as in Fig. 1, except for 933 
? ??2 ? 0.002 and ?1 ? 0.002 in (a) and (b) or ?1 ? 0.012 in (c) and (d). 934 
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 935 
Figure 3. Effects of information on corrupt enforcers. (a) Trajectories of the harvester-936 
enforcer dynamics originating from 100 randomly chosen initial conditions. Most trajectories 937 
converge to opportunistic conditionally cooperative harvesters and honest enforcers, while 938 
some trajectories converge to non-committing defecting harvesters and corrupt enforcers. (b) 939 
Fraction of trajectories converging to cooperative harvesting as a function of the probability 940 
p  of recognizing corrupt enforcers. For all values of p , many more trajectories end up with 941 
cooperative harvesting than in the basic model without information on corrupt enforcers. 942 
Parameters as in Fig. 1, except for p ? 0.34 in (a). 943 
 944 
Figure 4 (to be located in Appendix B). Effects on harvester dynamics of information on 945 
corrupt enforcers. (a) Trajectories of the harvester dynamics when all enforcers are honest. 946 
Regardless of the probability p  of recognizing corrupt enforcers, and for any initial 947 
condition, opportunistic conditional cooperators prevail. (b) Trajectories when all enforcers 948 
are corrupt and p  is small ( 0.2p ? ). The triangle is divided into two sectors, implying 949 
bistability. For initial conditions in the upper sector, conditional cooperators prevail. Initial 950 
conditions in the lower sector converge to a heteroclinic cycle, along which defectors prevail. 951 
The size of the upper sector decreases as p  increases. (c) Trajectories when all enforcers are 952 
corrupt and p  is intermediate ( p ? 0.34). The triangle edges form a heteroclinic cycle, along 953 
which defectors prevail. (d) Trajectories when all enforcers are corrupt and p  is large 954 
( 0.8p ? ). The triangle is divided into two sectors, implying bistability. For initial conditions 955 
in the lower sector, non-committing defectors prevail. Initial conditions in the upper sector 956 
converge to a heteroclinic cycle, along which defectors prevail. The size of the upper sector 957 
decreases as p  increases. 958 
959 
Page 44 of 45 
Tables 960 
 961 
Table 1. Payoffs when information on corrupt enforcers is not available. 962 
(a) Payoffs for harvesters accompanied by an honest enforcer as a function of the pair of 963 
harvester strategies (matrix hH ) 964 
 Conditional cooperator 
Committing 
cooperator Committing defector 
Non-committing 
cooperator 
Non-committing 
defector 
Conditional cooperator b ?c ? s b ?c ? s ?c ? s b 0 
Committing cooperator b ?c ? s b ?c ? s ?c ? s b ?c  ?c  
Committing defector b ? s? A b ? s? A ?s? A b 0 
Non-committing cooperator ?c  b ?c ?c  b ?c  ?c  
Non-committing defector 0 b 0 b 0 
(b) Payoffs for harvesters accompanied by a corrupt enforcer as a function of the pair of 965 
harvester strategies (matrix cH ) 966 
 Conditional cooperator 
Committing 
cooperator Committing defector 
Non-committing 
cooperator 
Non-committing 
defector 
Conditional cooperator b ?c ? s b ?c ? s ?c ? s b 0 
Committing cooperator b ?c ? s b ?c ? s ?c ? s b ?c  ?c  
Committing defector b ? s?B b ? s?B ?s?B b 0 
Non-committing cooperator ?c  b ?c ?c  b ?c  ?c  
Non-committing defector 0 b 0 b 0 
(c) Payoffs for an honest enforcer as a function of the pair of harvester strategies (matrix hE ) 967 
 Conditional cooperator 
Committing 
cooperator 
Committing 
defector 
Non-committing 
cooperator 
Non-committing 
defector 
Conditional cooperator 2s  2s  2s  0 0 
Committing cooperator 2s  2s  2s  0 0 
Committing defector 2s  2s  2s  0 0 
Non-committing cooperator 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-committing defector 0 0 0 0 0 
(d) Payoffs for a corrupt enforcer as a function of the pair of harvester strategies (matrix cE ) 968 
 Conditional cooperator 
Committing 
cooperator 
Committing 
defector 
Non-committing 
cooperator 
Non-committing 
defector 
Conditional cooperator 2s  2s       2s+B 0 0 
Committing cooperator 2s  2s  2s+B 0 0 
Committing defector 2s+B 2s+B     2s+2B 0 0 
Non-committing cooperator 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-committing defector 0 0 0 0 0 
969 
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Table 2. Payoffs when information on corrupt enforcers is available. 970 
(a) Payoffs for harvesters 971 
 Opportunistic conditional cooperator 
Opportunistic 
committing defector Non-committing defector 
Opportunistic 
conditional cooperator y1 ? y2 1? p? ?2? ?b ? c ? s? ? 1? p? ?py2 ?c ? s? ? 0 
Opportunistic 
committing defector p 1? p? ?y2 b ? s ?B? ? p2y2 ?s ?B? ? 0 
Non-committing defector 0 0 0 
(b) Payoffs for enforcers 972 
Honest enforcer 212sx  
Corrupt enforcer ? ? ? ?21 3 1 3 32 1 2 1s p x px B p x px px? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  
 973 
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